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"IT'S NOT YOU, IT'S ME" - WHEN ARE

CLIENT COMPANIES LIABLE FOR
STAFFING FIRMS' DISCRIMINATORY
HIRING PRACTICES?
LARA SAMUELS*
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission indicates that a client
company may face liability if it knows or should know that a staffing
firm uses discriminatory hiring practices but nonetheless maintains a
contractualrelationship with saidfirm. This Comment points out that
Congress has not yet articulateda consistent standardfor holding client
companies liablefor discriminatory hiring practices of a staffing firm.
In determining whether Congress should establish such liability, this
Comment unearths common discriminatory hiringpractices by staffing
firms and demonstrates that the current body of law does not
adequately address who carries the responsibility to uncover and
respond to discriminatory hiring practices in the modern workforce.
This Comment emphasizes that the failure to consolidate different legal
principles into a common duty of care, coupled with the prevalence of
settlement agreements, causes undesirable results for workers and
businesses. To resolve these issues, this Comment calls for a dutybased approach to discrimination cases involving staffing firms and
client companies. It suggests a potential basisfor an overarchingduty
by extrapolating a variety of legal principles that factor into court
decisions and statutory interpretations.
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INTRODUCTION

"It's not you, it's me." A defendant in a civil action will likely never
utter this popular phrase from the dating world. Yet, businesses readily
concede client company liability for the actions by staffing agencies in an
effort to educate the workforce and prevent investigation and legal action
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").' This
suggested liability is based primarily on the Commission's liberal
interpretation of discrimination liability: the notion that liability based on
employer-status should be assigned to non-employers. 2
As employers increased their use of staffing agencies to hire workers, the
EEOC, commentators, and the courts have paid much attention to staffing
firm liability for employment discrimination by its clients. 3 The EEOC has
explained that a staffing firm and its client may both be held liable for
discrimination when the staffing firm follows its client's discriminatory
orders with regard to hiring practices.4 The EEOC has further clarified that
in situations where the staffing agency has knowledge that its client
discriminates against the agency's workers, but fails to take appropriate
measures, the agency may also be held liable for discrimination.5
1. This Comment uses the terms "client companies" or "clients" interchangeably
to refer to the entities that engage the services of a staffing firm. See Aaron Green,
Staffing firms: an overview of services offered, HR CENTER ON STAFFING (Mar. 24,
2007), available at http://www.boston.com/jobs/on-staffing/042307.shtml.

For some

examples of websites that clarify employment relationships and potential liability for
employers who engage the services of staffing agencies, see, e.g., Michael Harris,
EEOC is Watching You: Recruitment Discrimination Comes to the Forefront, ERE
(May 30, 2006), http://www.ere.net/2006/05/30/eeoc-is-watching-you-recruitmentdiscrimination-comes-to-the-forefront/ (cautioning that the EEOC's compliance manual
requires that recruitment and hiring can create legal liability for all parties, not just the
employment agency or the employer, and that clients may be responsible for the
discriminatory acts performed by another party); Your Legal Obligation to Temporary
Agency Workers, PERSONNEL POL'Y SERV., INC., http://www.ppspublishers.com/
articles/legal temp-workers.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (acknowledging the
EEOC's directive that even if the agency or the client is not the employer, both may
still be liable under the antidiscrimination laws).
2.
See Daniel P. O'Gorman, Payingfor the Sins of Their Clients: The EEOC's
Position That Staffing Firms can be Liable When Their Clients Terminate an Assigned
Employee for a Discriminatory Reason, 112 PENN ST. L. REv. 425, 457 (2007)
(demonstrating that the EEOC's view lacks firm support in the case law).
3. See John R. Merinar, Jr., When Staffing Companies Discriminate:Is the Client
Liable?, 18.12 W. VA. EMP. L. LETTER 4, 1 (2013) (asserting that legal publications
have devoted substantial attention to the liability incurred by a staffing company if a
client discriminates against its employees).
4.
EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NOTICE No. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF EEO LAWS TO CONTINGENT WORKERS PLACED BY
TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER STAFFING FIRMS 3 (1997)
[hereinafter EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE].

5.

See id. at 33.
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However, it remains unclear whether a client company similarly faces
liability if it knows or should know of a staffing firm's discriminatory
practice but nonetheless maintains a contractual relationship with said
firm.6 Even though common sense and morality dictate that a company
should sever ties with an agency that discriminates against employees or
job seekers, such liability assessment and assignment of responsibilities
should be firmly rooted in the law.
This Comment argues that Congress should clarify the principle and
rationale underlying the liability for staffing firms whose clients
discriminate, as well as for client companies who maintain relationships
with discriminatory staffing agencies to preserve the uniform character of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII").8 Part II of this
Comment describes the rules and guidelines that currently hold staffing
firms and their clients liable for employment discrimination. Part III
explains that the current body of law fails to establish an adequate standard
of liability and causes uncertainty among client companies as to how far
their liability extends. Part IV argues that the principles and rationales on
which client company liability is based should be articulated in Title VII,
so as to ensure uniformity and awareness, as well as to avoid costly
litigation.
I.

THE CURRENT LAW SURROUNDING STAFFING FIRMS'
DISCRIMINATORY HIRING PRACTICES

The EEOC has issued a number of guidelines detailing the standard and

scope of liability for staffing companies and client firms in a wide variety
of circumstances. 9 Similarly, the common law suggests several theories of
liability.10 Taken together, these guidelines and court rulings establish
liability for client companies who make discriminatory hiring requests and
6.
See Merinar, supra note 3, at 2 (explaining that this question cannot be
answered with certainty because it is hard to predict what courts will do).
7.
Cf O'Gorman, supra note 2, at 426 (arguing that an EEOC position which has
no support in the statutes should be rejected).
8.
Cf McAdoo v. Toll, 591 F. Supp. 1399, 1402 (D. Md. 1984) (explaining that
the procedures of Title VII were not intended to serve as a stumbling block to the
accomplishment of the statutory objective).
See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 2.
9.
10. See Jason E. Pirruccello, Note, Contingent Worker Protection from Client
Company Discrimination: Statutory Coverage, Gaps, and the Role of the Common
Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 191, 193 (2005) (arguing that workers have adequate protection
from discrimination via judicial interpretations of Title VII, such as under a theory of
discriminatory interference of an existing or prospective third-party employment
relationship or by acknowledging indirect or de facto employment relationships
between contingent employees and client companies).
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staffing firms who honor such requests." They further establish that both
client companies and staffing firms may be liable to workers in cases where
discrimination occurs at the client's workplace, even if the claimant is
technically the employee of the staffing company but not of the client.12
On a few occasions, the EEOC suggested that client companies may face
liability for maintaining a relationship with discriminatory staffing firms.' 3
Furthermore, several states have recently passed legislation making it
unlawful to discriminate against a job applicant based on his or her status
as unemployed, a widespread practice among employment agencies.14
A.

Partieswho may be Involved in Employment DiscriminationLitigation

The types of employment discrimination disputes discussed in this
Comment generally involve workers, staffing firms, client companies, and
the EEOC.
1.

Workers, Staffing Firms, and Client Companies

To avoid drawing legal conclusions about the liability and coverage that
an individual may receive,' 5 this Comment frequently uses the term
"worker" instead of "employee" (individuals who are engaged by an

I1. See, e.g., Williams v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA), Inc., No. ELH-10-3476,
2012 WL 1698282, at *24 (D. Md. May 11, 2012) (referring to the EEOC Guidance
providing that a staffing firm is liable if it honors a client's discriminatory assignment
request).
12.
See id. (accepting the view that a staffing firm is liable for its discriminatory
assignment decisions even when it is based on its client's requirements); cf Koch v.
Holder, 930 F. Supp. 2d 14, 17 (D.D.C. 2013) (acknowledging that under limited
circumstances, a plaintiff may bring a discrimination claim against a non-employer
defendant if the defendant controls and denies access to employment).
13.
See, e.g., Julia Mendez, Use of Staffing Agencies: Things Companies Should
Know, THE
NEw
EEO SOURCE,
http://www.eeosource.com/knowledgebase
/equalopportunity/useofstaffingagencies.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (suggesting
that the BP Oil company avoided liability for discriminatory hiring decisions of
staffing firms hired by BP's contractors by voluntarily entering into a settlement
agreement).
14.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1368 (2012); see generally Mary Price Birk, New

Employment Law Compliance Strategies and Concernsfor Attorneys and Clients, in
THE IMPACT OF RECENT REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 21,

(2013) (cautioning that employers should be increasingly aware of legislation enacted
statewide around the country).
15.
See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers:An
Analysis of Employees and Employers Who Operate in the Borderland Between an
Employer-and-Employee Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 605, 628, 658 (2012)
(explaining that, when dealing with any question of labor and employment law, one
must first examine whether a private or public employer is involved and that, beyond
this distinction, cases involving the definition of an employer and the definition of
employee are somewhat elusive).
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employer).16 Staffing firms hire their own workers and either assign them
to client companies according to the client companies' needs or connect job
seekers with potential employers.' 7 This Comment relies heavily on the
terminology used in the EEOC Guidelines.' 8
2.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

The EEOC has the authority to investigate, administer, interpret, and
enforce federal anti-discrimination laws.19 The Commission may also
bring action against employers who violate such laws.20 Because of the
EEOC's interpretive role, courts frequently adopt its proposed standards
and guidelines, while employers similarly look to EEOC interpretations in
order to determine when and under what circumstances they may be held
liable for discrimination.21

16.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), (f) (2012) defining
"employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or
more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person."). Because the
distinction between public and private sector employees reaches beyond the scope of
this Comment, my discussion will focus primarily on employee definitions that are
assigned independently of these classifications. See Rubinstein, supra note 15, at 605
(stating that in most cases, coverage of employment laws boils down to the question of
whether the individuals in question are "employees" and whether the entity in question
is an "employer").
17.
See Staffing Clients: Definition of Staffing Services, AM. STAFFING Ass'N,
http://www.americanstaffing.net/definitions.cfm (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (stating that
staffing firms bring qualified job candidates together with potential employers for the
purpose of establishing a temporary or permanent employment relationship).
See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 2 (using the term
18.
"staffing firm" interchangeably with temporary employment agencies, contract firms,
and other firms that hire workers and place them in job assignments with the firm's
clients).
19.
About EEOC: Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2014); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259-60 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that EEOC is
entitled to deference generally accorded to other administrative agencies).
20. See Rebecca H. White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment
Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory
Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 51, 56 (1995) (mentioning that Congress granted
the EEOC the power to bring enforcement suits in the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 706(f)(1), 86 Stat. 103, 105 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988))).
21.
See id. at 62 n.69 (citing Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314,
319 (E.D. La. 1970)) (giving great deference to EEOC Guidelines requiring "validated"
employment tests under Title V1l); see also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
RESOURCE
MGMT.,
http://www.shrm.org/Legallssues
SOC'Y
FOR
HUM.
/Federal Resources/FederalStatutesRegulationsandGuidanc/Pages/TitleViloftheCivilRig
htsActofl964.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
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FederalAnti-DiscriminationStatutes

This Comment focuses on two federal anti-discrimination statutes that
serve as vehicles for protected groups to enjoy equal opportunity for
employment and workplace accommodation.
1.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VII provides that equal employment opportunities cannot be denied
to any person on the basis of his or her race, color, national origin, sex, or
religion.2 2 In 1991, Congress expanded the coverage of Title VII to
proscribe discrimination in employment and prohibit employers from
retaliating against an employee for engaging in the enforcement of Title
VII.23

2.

Americans with DisabilitiesAct

The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") provides protections to
persons with disabilities that are like the civil right protections afforded to
individuals covered by Title VII. 2 4 The ADA explicitly states that
maintaining a contractual relationship with an employment or referral
agency that has the effect of subjecting an otherwise qualified applicant to
discrimination amounts to discrimination.2 5
C.

Discriminatoryand "Quasi-Discriminatory"HiringPractices

Many companies use staffing agencies to hire temporary or permanent
workers.26 Where a staffing agency assigns workers to a client company,
the worker will traditionally be considered an employee of the staffing
company, rather than of the client. 2 7 Nonetheless, employees, as well as

22. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
23. Jana H. Carey, General Overview of Employment Relationships Within the
Framework of Title VI, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. G-1, at 3
(1998) (providing an overview of governing regulatory schemes).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2); EEOC v. Olsten Staffing Servs. Corp., 657 F.
Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (W.D. Wis. 2009); see also Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),
U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs
/hq9805.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (explaining that the ADA guarantees
individuals with disabilities equal opportunity in employment).
25.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2).
26.
Buchanan Ingersoll, EEOC Issues Guidance on Treatment of Contingent
Workers, 8.5 PA. EMP. L. LETTER 4, at 1 (1998) (recognizing that a growing number of
employees are employed by temporary agencies).
27. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 7 (stating that the
staffing firm generally qualifies as the worker's employer because it typically hires the
worker, determines when and where the worker should report to work, pays the wages,
is itself in business, withholds taxes and social security, provides workers'
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non-employees, can find relief for discrimination. 2 8 Despite the current
protections, staffing firms continue to discriminate and "quasidiscriminate" against current and prospective employees.2 9
1.

"Quasi-Discrimination"

For purposes of this Comment, procedures that may adversely affect
ethnic groups and women qualify as "quasi-discriminatory" hiring
practices. 30 Some hiring procedures may have such an effect if they
discourage certain groups from applying or if they systematically prevent
qualified minorities from knowing about the opportunities. 3 1 Even though
such practices are not inherently illegal, they can become illegal if they
adversely impact protected groups. 32 Various reports point to situations in
compensation coverage, and has the right to discharge the worker).
See Pirruccello,supra note 10, at 222 (arguing that contingent workers have
28.
protection from unlawful discrimination similar to the protection afforded full-time
care employees).
29.
See Laura Bassett, How Employers Weed Out Unemployed Job Applicants,
Others, Behind The Scenes, THE HUFFINGTON PosT (Jan. 14, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/14/unemployed-job-applicants-discrimination
_n_809010.html (conceding that staffing firms recognize code words used by clients
while regularly accommodating client demands such as finding someone of a particular
gender or within a particular age bracket).
30.
See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective
Theory of Discrimination,73 VA. L. REv. 1297, 1344-45 (1987) (arguing that disparate
impact theory is an example of federal common law, resting on a practical need to
prevent pretextual discrimination by institutional defendants).
31.
See Russell Specter & Paul J. Spiegelman, Employment DiscriminationAction
Under Federal Civil Rights Acts, 21 AM. JUR. IST Trials §§ 24-26 (1974) (introducing
examples such as word of mouth recruitment, sex-differentiated advertising, or
exclusionary media and messages); see also Bassett, supra note 29 (discussing the
widespread practice among employers and staffing agencies to exclude from
consideration candidates who are not currently or recently employed); Brianna Lee,
'Unemployed Need Not Apply', PBS (Jul. 28, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to(stating that a nonprofit
know/the-daily-need/unemployed-need-not-apply/10736/
organization surveying the labor market found nearly 150 ads from Careerbuilder,
Monster, Indeed, and Craigslist that openly discriminated against potential candidates,
asking them not to apply unless they were currently employed).
32. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep't of Justice, Justice
Department Settles Immigration-related Discrimination Claim Against Alabama
Employment Agency (Jul. 3, 2013) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release], available at
(reporting on a settlement
http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2013/July/13-crt-756.html
agreement between the Justice Department and a staffing agency who required specific
documents issued by the Department of Homeland Security from non-U.S. citizens
during the employment eligibility verification process, but accepted a variety of
identity and work authorization documentation from U.S. citizens); see also Sheri
Splichal, Staffing Agencies, Your Company, and Background Checks, 3RD DEGREE
SCREENING (Jul. 2, 2013), http://www.3rddegreescreening.com/news/bid/313444/
Staffing-agencies-your-company-and-background-checks (advising readers that client
companies have a duty to inform themselves of staffing firms' background check
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which staffing firms have independently and regularly used quasidiscriminatory practices that had such an adverse effect.
Nonetheless,
neither federal law nor a majority of states' laws deem practices such as
unemployment discrimination illegal, although a number of states and
municipalities have started to prohibit them. 3 4
2.

IndependentDiscriminationby Staffing Firms

A couple of recent examples illustrate that staffing firms independently
discriminate against prospective employees.
According to a recent
decision in the Wisconsin District Court, EEOC v. Olsten Staffing Servs.

Corp., a reasonable jury could conclude that a staffing agency
discriminated against a deaf job applicant on the basis of his disability. 36
The court noted that the agency specialist's deviation from the agency's
general practice 3 7 reasonably suggests that she discriminated against the
plaintiff.38 The court pointed out that the specialist treated the plaintiff
differently, although he was otherwise qualified for the position and the
client company had given the specialist no information suggesting that a
deaf person would be unable to perform the job's essential functions.39
After the client indicated that it would not hire the plaintiff without
providing an explicit reason, the specialist did not refer the plaintiff to the
policies because a client could face liability if the staffing firm refuses to hire
individuals based solely on the fact that they have a criminal history).
33.
See, e.g., EEOC to Examine Treatment of Unemployed Job Seekers (2011)
(written testimony of Algernon Austin, PhD, Director, Program on Race, Ethnicity, and
the Economy, Economic Policy Institute) [hereinafter Austin Testimony], available at
http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-16-1I/Austin.cfm.
34.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1362 (2012) (prohibiting employers and
employment agencies from discriminating against applicants because they are
unemployed); Birk, supra note 14 (noting that New Jersey passed a similar law, which
took effect in 2011, prohibiting unemployment discrimination in job advertisements);
see also Rutherglen, supra note 30, at 1298 (observing that the principal prohibitions of
Title VII do not refer to disparate impact at all).
35.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Olsten Staffing Servs. Corp., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033
(W.D. Wis. 2009) (featuring a representative of a staffing firm who discriminated
against a qualified disabled applicant on the basis of her belief that the client would not
accommodate the applicant's disability).
36.
See id. at 1038.
37.
See id. at 1031 (providing that, as a general hiring practice, Olsten's staffing
specialist sent a survey sheet to applicants whom she believed to be qualified and then
sent the completed sheet back to its client and-unless the client objected within a day
or so-the candidate would begin working).
38. See id. (explaining that the specialist used a different procedure in the
plaintiffs case, which involved e-mailing the client, indicating that the candidate
would like to work for the client, but that her only hesitation is that he is deaf and
whether this would be too much of a concern for the client).
39. See id. at 1036.
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client when another position opened up.4 0 Furthermore, when the plaintiff
requested a reason for why the client did not want to hire the plaintiff, the
specialist appeared to invent a justification for the decision, telling him that
the client was concerned about plaintiff s ability to hear the forklifts, which
was false information, and she had no knowledge that the client had any
such concerns. 41
Another example arose in 2012, when BP Exploration and Production,
Inc. ("BP") entered into a settlement agreement with the EEOC after a
number of women complained that BP's contractors discriminated against
female job applicants.42 The class of affected women alleged that BP's
contractors did not consider them to work on the cleanup effort following
an oil spill in 2010, based solely on their gender.43 While the EEOC never
determined that BP violated anti-discrimination laws and BP argued that it
did nothing wrong, the settlement agreement included a provision that BP
provide training to its administrators who engage contractors.44
Furthermore, the EEOC praised BP for resolving the matter outside of
court action and for refusing to tolerate discriminatory hiring practices by
any contractor who works for BP.45
Similarly, a recent action brought against Stellar Staffing agency offers
another example of independent employment discrimination by staffing
firms. In this case, the employment agency violated the anti-discrimination
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act by demanding more
specific documents during the employment eligibility verification process
from foreign nationals while being more flexible with documentation of
U.S. citizens.46 This action supports the notion that staffing companies

40.
41.

See id.
See id. at 1032 (demonstrating that, instead of remaining neutral, the specialist

relied on her own belief of what caused her client to reject the applicant when she
claimed that the client needed the plaintiff to be able to hear the forklifts).
42. See Press Release, Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC and BP Resolve
Claims Related to Contractor Hiring During Gulf Response (June 29, 2012)
[hereinafter EEOC & BP Press Release], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/newsroom/release/6-29-12.cfm; Mendez, supra note 13 (reporting that BP agreed
to pay up to $5.4 million to the class of women who applied for jobs with the
contractors during the emergency response).
43.
See EEOC & BP Press Release, supra note 42 (reporting that the staffing
agencies utilized by BP's contractors allegedly used discriminatory hiring practices).
44. See id.
45.
See id.
46. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 32 (indicating that staffing firms treat
applicants differently in the hiring process based on discriminatory assumptions about
their citizenship status).
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independently violate anti-discrimination provisions by treating applicants
differently on the basis of national origin without a client's request. 4 7
D.

Common Law Remedies

The following common law tests serve as useful tools in determining
whether liability can be assigned in cases of non-traditional employment.48
1.

Joint Employer Liability and Control

Joint employment assigns liability to client companies in cases where a
client discriminates against a worker or applicant who would otherwise be
considered the employee of a staffing firm. 4 9 According to the EEOC, a
staffing company and its client can be held liable as joint employers if both
have the right to exercise control over the employee.50 This concept seems
to be consistent with the view of the Federal Courts and the Supreme
Court.5 Similarly, courts agree that staffing companies that honor their
clients' demands, if they are based on discriminatory reasons, may face
liability for discrimination.52

47. See id. (reporting that Stellar Staffing agency agreed to pay $2,250 in civil
penalties and undergo training on anti-discrimination provisions).
48. See Pirruccello,supra note 10, at 192, 204.
49. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4, 12, at 29.
50. See id. at 8.
51.
See, e.g., Moldenhauer v. Tazewell-Pekin Consol. Commc'n Ctr., 536 F.3d
640, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[J]oint employment will ordinarily be found to exist
when a temporary or leasing agency supplies employees to a second employer.");
Carparts Distrib. Ctr. Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England Inc., 37 F.3d
12, 17 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that defendants function as employers if they exercise
significant control over an important aspect of his employment); Watson v. Adecco
Emp't Servs. Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1356 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that a
temporary employment agency was not an employer because it exercised no control
over the plaintiffs' responsibilities or duties once on assignment); Stephanie Greene &
Christine Neylon O'Brien, Who Counts?: The United States Supreme Court Cites
"Control" as the Key to Distinguishing Employers From Employees Under Federal
Employment Antidiscrimination Laws, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 761, 780 (2003)
(citing Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, 548 U.S. 440, 440 (2003)
(looking to control as the deciding factor in determining whether an employment
relationship exists)).
52. See Shah v. Littlefuse Inc., No. 12 CV 6845, 2013 WL 1828926, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 29, 2013) ("Courts addressing the liability of temporary employment agencies
have held that a staffing or employment agency found to be a joint employer may be
held liable under Title VII if the agency knew or should have known of the
discriminatory conduct and failed to take prompt corrective measures within its
control.").
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Tortious Interferencefor Non-Employers

A person may be liable for tortiously interfering with a contract between
two other parties if he intentionally induces or otherwise causes one party
not to perform the contract.53 A court could find a client company liable
for tortious interference of the plaintiffs employment contract. 54 Though
5
tests vary across jurisdictions,"
tortious interference generally requires that
the client company interfere with a direct employment relationship, such as
that between a contingent worker and a staffing company. 56 Under these
circumstances, even if the company does not exercise its control to turn the
worker into an employee, the discrimination toward the worker could still
damage the worker's relationship with the staffing company. 57
Even though the common law provides some ways to afford protection
to non-traditional employees and applicants, neither the common law nor
the EEOC Guidelines have thus far pronounced a consistent underlying
justification or rationale for holding staffing firms and their clients
responsible for each other's wrongful acts.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 3.
55. See McGanty v. Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841, 846-47 (Or. 1995) (holding that
since the plaintiff employee admitted that the supervisor had been acting within his
scope of employment at all times, the plaintiff had no claim for intentional interference
with economic relations); Pirruccello, supra note 10, at 210 (citing George A. Fuller
Co. v. Chi. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 719 F.2d 1326, 1332-33 (7th Cir. 1983)
(analyzing the necessary elements of malice and third-party status in a tortious
interference case)); see also Christopher v. Stouder Mem'1 Hosp., 936 F.2d 870, 875
(6th Cir. 1991) (proposing that the defendant may be liable if he significantly affects
access of any individual to employment opportunities); Lyons v. Midwest Glazing, 265
F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1075 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (holding that tortious interference requires
intent, knowledge of an existing relationship, causation, and damages).
56. See Pirruccello, supra note 10, at 195 (explaining that contingent employees
may establish themselves as direct employees of a third party, typically a staffing
agency, and allege that the defendant employer discriminatorily and harmfully
interfered with the employment relationship).
57. See Sibley Mem'1 Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(holding that the liability of an employer who affects the employee of another entity
may depend on surrounding circumstances); Med. Indus. Inc. v. Maersk Med. Ltd., 230
F. Supp. 2d 857, 870-71 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that a defendant interfered with the
plaintiffs prospective economic relationship with a generically-defined third party is
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss when plaintiffs alleged that it had a reasonable
expectation of entering into valid business relationships with thousands of customers).
58.
See O'Gorman, supra note 2, at 441 ("The Commission does not disclose the
basis for its conclusion that a staffing firm must take corrective action when it has
reason to know a client terminated an employee's assignment for an unlawful reason.").
53.

54.
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E. Statutory Remedies
Under federal anti-discrimination statutes, injured parties may establish a
cause of action against employers who discriminate and quasidiscriminate. 59
Some states have enacted legislation prohibiting
unemployment discrimination and statutes against aiding and abetting
discrimination.60
1. DisparateImpact Theory under Title VII
Title VII explicitly forbids discrimination against individuals based on
race, sex, religion, national origin, physical disability, and age. 6 1 Even
though not all forms of discrimination are in themselves illegal,62 a cause of
action may arise if a quasi-discriminatory practice adversely affects
protected groups. 6 3 It remains unclear whether client companies could be
held liable in cases where staffing firms independently use such quasidiscriminatory practices.
2.

Provisions of the ADA ProvideLiabilityfor Clients who Maintain
a ContractualRelationship With DiscriminatoryEmployment
Agencies

In cases arising out of disability discrimination, an employer may face
liability regardless of the source of the discrimination. 64 Furthermore, a
company who is neither an employer nor a prospective employer of a
discriminated party may still qualify as a "covered entity" 6 5 under the ADA
if, for instance, the company maintains a contractual relationship with a

59. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
60.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1368 (2012); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(7) (1994).
61.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
62.
See, e.g., Donna Ballman, 8 Ways Employers Can Discriminate Against
Workers-Legally, AOL JOBS (Nov. 19, 2012), http://jobs.aol.com/articles/2012/11/19/
8-ways-employers-can-discriminate-against-workers-legally/
(explaining that an
employer can legally refuse to hire a person due to bad credit and physical appearance);
see also Bassett, supra note 29 (illustrating that, though prohibited in a small number
of states, there is no federal law prohibiting unemployment discrimination).
63. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective
Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REv. 1297, 1297 (1987) (citing Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)) (extending Title VHI to facially neutral employment
practices with an adverse impact on persons of a particular race, natural origin, sex, or
religion).
64. See EEOC v. Olsten Staffing Servs. Corp., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1036 (W.D.
Wis. 2009) (holding that an employer has a duty to protect its employees from
discrimination by its clients, whether it comes from an employee, independent
contractor, or even a customer).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (defining a "covered entity" as an employer, employment
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee).
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discriminatory staffing agency. 66 The ADA provides that both a staffing
firm and its client can be held liable if either one knows, or should have
known, that the other discriminates against the agency's workers but fails
to take appropriate measures. 67
The EEOC has provided an explicit corresponding instruction in its
ADA Guidelines for client company liability in situations where staffing
firms fail to provide reasonable accommodations to the disabled during the
hiring process. However, the Commission has not yet provided a similar
guideline for other anti-discrimination statutes, although it has on occasion
alluded to such standards. 68
3.

State Statutes on Aiding and Abetting DiscriminationLegislation

A state's statute on aiding and abetting of discrimination may also
expose client companies to liability.69 For instance, West Virginia's
Human Rights statute might lend support to claims implicating clients who
continue a relationship with a discriminatory staffing agency. 70 A number
of other states' human rights statutes include similar aiding-and-abetting
provisions.7 It is not clear, however, whether mere knowledge and
inaction, such as maintaining a contractual relationship with a
discriminatory staffing agency, is sufficient to find liability under the
statutes.72

66.

See id.; Olsten Staffing Servs. Corp., 657 F. Supp. 2d at 1032-33 (carving out

liability for participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship,
including a relationship with an employment or referral agency, that has the effect of
subjecting a qualified applicant or employee with a disability to discrimination).
67.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2); see also Olsten Staffing Servs. Corp., 657 F.
Supp. 2d at 1032 (mentioning that employment agencies can be held accountable for
discrimination even if they do not have unilateral authority to place or reject an
applicant).
68.
See, e.g., Mendez, supra note 13 (suggesting that BP avoided liability for
discriminatory hiring decisions of staffing firms hired by BP's contractors by
voluntarily entering into a settlement agreement).
69. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(5) (2011) (prohibiting any person,
whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the
doing of any act declared to be a discriminatory employment practice or to attempt to
do so); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(7) (1994) (making it illegal to aid or abet another in
engaging in unlawful discriminatory practices).
70. See Holstein v. Norandex, Inc., 461 S.E.2d. 473, 478 (W. Va. 1995) (holding
that a plaintiff may bring action not only against supervisors but also against another
employee for aiding or abetting an employer engaging in unlawful discrimination
practices).
71.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(5); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-18
(1995); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(6) (McKinney 2010).
72. See, e.g., Merinar, supra note 3, at 2 (claiming that neither West Virginia
courts nor the Supreme Court have ruled on the matter).
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States' Unemployment DiscriminationLegislation

In response to increasing allegations of discrimination based on
unemployment status, a number of districts, cities, and states have enacted
legislation to prevent such practices. In March 2012, for instance, the
District of Columbia enacted the Unemployed Anti-Discrimination Act of
2012.73 Similarly, a number of other jurisdictions have enacted regulations
to protect unemployed job applicants.74
II.

EFFECTS OF STAFFING FIRMS' DISCRIMINATION ON PROTECTED
GROUPS AND THE CHAOS OF LIABILITY

The increasing reliance on staffing firms in the wake of a changing job

market7 5 increasingly complicates employer-employee relationships. 7 6
Even though employment laws cover most individuals who are deemed
employees, issues have arisen in situations where the employeremployment relationship is not so clearly defined.
Furthermore, there is
no consistent principle justifying a finding of liability under either the
statute or the common law.

73. See D.C. CODE § 32-1362 (2012) (prohibiting employers and employment
agencies from discriminating against applicants because they are unemployed); see also
Birk, supra note 14 (noting that New Jersey passed a similar law, which took effect in
2011, prohibited unemployment discrimination in job advertisements).
74. See Birk, supra note 14 (demonstrating that Connecticut, Florida, Illinois,
Michigan, New York, and Oregon have enacted such legislation).
75. New information technology has narrowed the importance of employees'
specialized skills, whereas companies' flexibility and ability to respond to the changing
dictates and demands of the marketplace has become increasingly important. See
KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT, ROBERT N. COVINGTON & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, LEGAL
PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 46-52 (4th ed. 2010) (citing Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology: Implicationsfor

Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 10-14, 52 (2001)) (arguing further that the
focus on reorganizing firms in leaner ways that are internally more subject to the
machinations of the market makes large and costly human resource departments less
desirable).
76.
See Mark Crandley, Note, The Failure of the Integrated Enterprise Test: Why
Courts Need to Find New Answers to the Multiple-Employer Puzzle in Federal

Discrimination Cases, 75 IND. L.J. 1041, 1041 (2000) (observing that the increase in
independent and temporary work, smaller technology-based firms, and new corporate
forms, have permanently altered the world of work); cf DAU-SCHMIDT, COVINGTON &
FINKIN, supra note 75, at 45, 50 (describing employer/contractor distinctions as being
drawn more woodenly in U.S. courts than in other countries, even though Dau-Schmidt
suggests that employment relationships be adaptable to the changes in our economy).
77. See Pirruccello, supra note 10, at 192 (acknowledging that commentators have
criticized the general failure of labor and employment laws to protect the contingent
workforce).
78.

See Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 17 (2010) (arguing that two or more contractual
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While the EEOC does not have legislative powers, it does have the
authority to interpret anti-discrimination legislation.79
Courts have
generally accepted these interpretations.so Particularly in the absence of
statutorily defined employee-like entities,81 the EEOC's Guidelines are an
arguably useful resource to client companies because they illustrate the
scope of employer liability. 8 2
A.

Inconsistency in FederalStatutes

Thus far, Congress has failed to establish whether a constructive
knowledge standard applies to clients who engage staffing firms when they
hire new workers. Furthermore, it fails to establish whether the ADA's
duties not to enter into contractual relationships resulting in discrimination
apply to both staffing firms and client companies or whether they apply
only in the context of disability-related discrimination. Because of the
uncertainty this creates, Congress should consider clarifying the scope of
this liability or adopting a duty-based approach to create more uniformity
in this area of law.
1.

Issues with Definitions

Even though the threshold question to finding employer liability asks
whether or not the defendant qualifies as an employer, certain situations
may also permit liability for non-employers.83 Although such nonemployer liability should rest on an independent duty, much of the analysis
provided by the courts and the EEOC guidelines derives the liability from

they ultimately perform work, emphasizing that "[t]hey are not 'employed' in any legal
sense by those companies, frequently rendering them 'beyond the grasp or reach of
employment law'.").
79. See About EEOC: Overview, supra note 19 (explaining the EEOC's authority

and role).
80. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986) (affirming the
lower court's decision to consider the supervisor an employer-which relied chiefly on
Title VII's definition of employer and on EEOC Guidelines).
81.
See Rubinstein, supra note 15, at 629 & nn.127-28 (citing DAU-SCHMIDT,
COVINGTON & FINKIN, supra note 75, at 45) (observing that some countries, such as
Germany, have developed intermediate categories such as "parasubordinated" persons
to cover employee-like persons in an effort to respond to the problem of defining
employee status).
82. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 63 (supporting the notion that client companies take
the guidance seriously because the Supreme Court has relied heavily on the EEOC
Guidelines in certain cases).
83. See, e.g., Neal v. Manpower Int'l Inc., No. 3:00-CV-277/LAC, 2001 WL
1923127, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2001) (holding that an employer can be liable for
harassment by a non-employee only if the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment).

"IT'S NOT YOU, IT'S ME"

2014

355

employer status.84 However, this approach fails to explore the duties of
third parties or non-employers who play a role in the hiring process, a
question which has received varying treatment across jurisdictions. The
courts' disparate treatment in attempting to assign non-employer liability
demonstrates a need for introducing a new classification of "quasiemployment" relationships, rather than applying existing statutory
provisions to non-employers according to differing standards of
employment characteristics. 6 It is important that legislative changes
include a clarification of the duties and responsibilities for "employerlike"87 persons and the principles shaping these duties.
2.

DifferingPrinciples Underlying Title VII and the ADA

Title VII's statutory character aims to achieve a national policy of
nondiscrimination, which inherently requires a uniform body of law that
clearly identifies the scope of obligations and responsibilities of companies

84. See Rubinstein, supra note 15, at 606 (shedding light on the "state of disarray"
in the law "with regard to the definition of employee [and employer] . . . .").
85. See, e.g., Carparts Distrib. Ctr. Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New
England Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1994) (prohibiting holding an individual
employee liable for violating a provision which, by its terms, restricts liability to
employers but allowing it under provisions that specifically refer to persons in addition
to employers, arguing that the statute intended it to apply to individuals other than
employers). But cf Johnson v. BE & K Constr. Co., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (S.D.
Iowa 2009) (implying that non-employer third parties may be held liable under certain
circumstances and that, although the defendant alleged that it was merely a customer,
the court allowed the inference that the defendant could still have supervisory authority
over plaintiff s employment).
86. See, e.g., EEOC v. Olsten Staffing Servs. Corp., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033
(W.D. Wis. 2009) (noting that, as an employer, a staffing firm has a duty to protect its
employees, regardless of the source); see also Rubinstein, supra note 15, at 657
(pointing out that the modem landscape of hiring procedures and employer-employee
relationships calls for a major "overhaul" in anti-discrimination legislation and that
much of the inconsistency surrounding employer liability arises from the struggle to
arrive at a common definition for employer); cf United States ex rel. Morgan v. Sci.
Applications Int'l Co., 604 F. Supp. 2d 245, 250 (D.D.C. 2009) (arguing that if
Congress had wanted to extend liability to non-employers, it would have done so by
using the words "any person," but it merely used the words "any employee, contractor,
or agent"). But see Leu v. Embraer Aircraft Maint. Servs., No. 3:10-0322, 2010 WL
1753616, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 30, 2010) (noting that courts have recognized the
theory of holding non-employers liable for third-party interference with employment
contracts under Title VII).
87. See Rubinstein, supra note 15, at 629 (indicating that a consistent definition
would be desirable); see also Esther Torres, The Spanish Law on Dependent SelfEmployed Workers: A New Evolution in Labor Law, 31 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 231,
234 (2010) (observing that Spain and other EU Member States have expanded the
borders of traditional employment to new parameters, based on three elements:
dependency, alienation from risks and benefits, and economic remuneration).
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who wish to hire workers through staffing firms. 8 Such uniformity can
only be achieved if the courts adopt or develop a consistent theory of
liability for client companies or if Congress passes legislation that
establishes the liability-parameters for staffing agencies, their clients, and
the workers involved.89
While the ADA establishes that a contractual relationship between
clients and staffing firms can result in liability,9 0 Title VII remains silent on
whether a similar standard applies to other types of discrimination as
well. 9 1 It would be helpful for Congress to clarify whether the duties of the
ADA standard arise specifically from a duty owed to persons with
disabilities, because if it applied to all forms of discrimination, employers
should be aware of such heightened duty. 92 The EEOC seems to believe
that such a duty exists.9 3 If we are to follow the EEOC's position,
Congress should explain the basis of the non-employer duty owed to
affected parties, and amend Title VII to include a provision similar to that
of the ADA in order to ensure that the common law remains consistent with
the statutory purpose of anti-discrimination legislation.94

88.
Cf McAdoo v. Toll, 591 F. Supp. 1399, 1406 (D. Md. 1984) ("An individual
occupying a supervisory position could be held liable for the acts of his underlings
when the employer of both can also be held liable, even where the supervisor has no
personal involvement. . . because placing an affirmative [implying consistent] duty to
prevent discriminatory acts on those who are charged with employment decisions
appears to be consistent with the aims of Title VII.").
89.
Cf DAU-SCHMIDT, COVINGTON & FINKIN, supra note 75, at 46-52 (suggesting
that the expansion of employer parameters in foreign jurisdictions may legitimate a
more flexible and statutorily-focused analysis by the legislature).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (2012) (stating that maintaining a contractual
relationship with an employment or referral agency that has the effect of subjecting an
otherwise qualified applicant to discrimination amounts to discrimination).
91.
See Kevin W. Williams, Note, The Reasonable Accommodation Difference:
The Effect of Applying the Burden Shifting Frameworks Developed under Title VII in
Disparate Treatment Cases to Claims Brought under Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 98, 98-99 (1997) (arguing that
employment discrimination under the ADA should sometimes be treated differently
than discrimination under Title VII).
92.
See McAdoo, 591 F. Supp. at 1406 (calling for an affirmative duty on
individuals who make employment decisions).
93.
See Mendez, supra note 13 (indicating that a company or its clients may be
liable for the discriminatory hiring practices of its staffing agencies, because it treated
BP as responsible for the discrimination committed by its contractors which is similar
to the ADA standard of imposing a heightened duty on clients who maintain
contractual relationships that result in discrimination).
94.
See O'Gorman, supra note 2, at 434-36 (indicating that there is not one single
common law test but several, none of which are entirely consistent with the statutory
purpose of Title VII); Rubinstein, supra note 15, at 627 (indicating that courts rely on
common law tests as the default standard where Congress has not specified an
appropriate standard).
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Alternatively, if Congress explains that the ADA's duty to refrain from
entering into a contractual relationship that results in discrimination against
applicants is disability-specific, the liability articulated by the EEOC on
staffing firms and clients may be questioned.95 Because client companies
frequently consider the Commission's Guidelines and prefer settlements
over in-court litigation, the EEOC's statements likely affect the legal
outcome of these employment discrimination matters. 9 6 It is therefore
important that, when the EEOC uses the opportunity to educate and inform
companies of liability, this information has a solid basis in the law. 9 7
3.

InconsistentApplication of the Statutes

The courts have not provided a coherent framework for determining
whether client companies, who know or should know that a staffing firm
discriminates, face liability if they enter into an agreement with that firm.
In particular, they do not fully explain how they derive employer status
from the tests used in non-traditional employment relationships." While
the Supreme Court looks to control as the deciding factor in determining
whether an employer-employee relationship exists, 99 the ADA carves out
potential liability for companies that do not have the authority to place or
reject an applicant. 00
As with the rationale governing the joint employment standard, the
Olsten court's inclination to hold staffing companies and their clients liable
seems to stem from the level of control that each party has over the hiring

95. See, e.g., O'Gorman, supra note 2, at 432 (making the argument that common
law tests should not merely be transplanted into statute, which allows for the inference
that if Title ViI's plain meaning actively excludes the ADA standard, the EEOC's
statements or courts simply applying the ADA standard to Title VII would be
inappropriate).
96. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000) (demonstrating
that, because the EEOC has the authority to interpret federal anti-discrimination laws,
litigants frequently look to the EEOC Guidelines to assess where liability can be
found).
97. See O'Gorman,supra note 2, at 458 (arguing that the EEOC standards are not
supported by the statutes' plain language).
98.
See Rogers, supra note 78, at 22 (citing Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,
331 U.S. 722 (1947)) (observing that the Court was not entirely clear why the factors it
relied on-for instance, that the worker did a specialty job and that the work took place
on the company's premise-established an employment relationship).
99.
See Greene & O'Brien, supra note 51, at 798 (stating that, in filling the gaps of
the sparse statutory language, the Court held that an individual's employment status
depends on whether he has control within the organization).
100. See EEOC v. Olsten Staffing Servs. Corp., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1038 (W.D.
Wis. 2009) (reasoning that the inclusion of employment agencies in the ADA
inherently accepts that an agency can be held liable even in absence of authority to
reject an applicant).
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process.i 0' It follows that, by maintaining such a relationship with a
discriminatory staffing agency, the client's omissions facilitate the
discrimination.102 If companies seeking to hire new workers have a duty
not to facilitate discrimination and to have reasonable knowledge of
discrimination that occurs in the hiring and recruitment process, then such
duties should apply to Title VII discrimination as well, rather than merely
being inferred by EEOC statements.10 3
In applying the ADA, the Seventh Circuit suggests that the duty to
protect workers from discrimination arises from a company's status as an
employer.104 At the same time, the court suggests imposing a duty on nonemployers to refrain from engaging in agreements that negatively impact
the employment opportunities of jobseekers.' 0 5 This is problematic
because the court freely assigns a duty that arises from employer status to
non-employers. If there is, in fact, a similar duty for non-employers in these
cases, this duty must find its basis in something other than employer
status. 106
B.

Inconsistency ofLegal PrinciplesCallfor CongressionalClarification

Certain common law rationales and statutes, prohibiting unemployment
discrimination while imposing aid-and-abet liability, provide support for a
client company's duty to avoid contractual relationships with staffing firms
if they know or should know that such firms discriminate. However,

101.

See Greene & O'Brien, supra note 51, at 780 (specifying that control is a

decisive factor among the six-factor approach); see also Olsten Staffing Servs. Corp.,
657 F. Supp. 2d at 1038 (emphasizing that, where a client contracts to receive workers
through a staffing agency, the client exercises a significant amount of control over the
individuals who ultimately get hired).
102. The court reasoned that, if the specialist truly believed that the client would not
hire the plaintiff because he could not hear the forklift, then her attempt to place the
plaintiff at another job would be an accommodation of a discriminatory attitude rather
than of the plaintiffs disability. See Olsten Staffing Servs. Corp., 657 F. Supp. 2d at
1038.
103. See White, supra note 20, at 74 (stating that the EEOC Guidelines are not
enforceable rules of law but should nonetheless be followed, particularly in cases of
ambiguity).
104. See Olsten Staffing Servs. Corp., 657 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (emphasis added)
("As Schaefer's employer, Olsten had a duty under the ADA to protect Schaefer from
discrimination by its clients.").
105. See id. at 1035 (emphasis added) ("[I]n a way that adversely affects the
opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such

applicant.").
106. See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that the obvious purpose of including an agent provision is to incorporate
respondeat superior liability into the statute, which could provide a rationale for
holding a client company liable for torts arising from the company's business).
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because these areas provide only bits and pieces, rather than articulating a
consistent principle for finding this duty, Congress should provide clear
guidance on the matter.
1.

Chaos in the Common Law

Because the plain language of Title VII concerns intentional
discrimination, an argument supporting vicarious liability for nonemployers must support the statute's purpose.' 0 7
Beyond the
inconsistencies between the ADA and Title VII, the common law tests for
determining liability for staffing firms and client companies further
illustrate the need for Congress to identify governing principles for nonemployer liability. However, it is important not to simply dismiss these
tests, as they could provide some helpful rationales to piece together an
employer-like duty.
a.

Aid andAbet Liability

While one commentator argues that the standards issued by the EEOC
are not firmly grounded in the common law,' 08 another source suggests that
a proper rationale may be found in state legislation on aiding and abetting
discrimination for holding non-employers liable for discriminatory hiring
practices.109 Such legislation, however, does not specify whether an
employer has a duty to take reasonable measures to find out whether
discrimination has occurred." 0 Furthermore, there is no uniformity as to
whether mere inaction is sufficient to find liability under such statutes,
resulting in an inconsistent application of the law.I

107. See O'Gorman, supra note 2, at 436, 457 (noting that statutes only allow for
liability when an employer or its agent engaged in intentional discrimination).
108. See id. at 464-65, 467-68 (arguing that acceptance of the "knows-or-shouldhave-known" standard for holding staffing firms liable for client discrimination is a
form of vicarious liability, the rationale of which, is not applicable to these cases, as the
client will already absorb and distribute the costs and instances of discrimination have
not been deemed a risk of doing business).
109. See Merinar,supra note 3, at 2 (suggesting that West Virginia's Human Rights
statute may be used to impose liability on a client who maintains a contractual
relationship with a discriminatory staffing firm).
110. Cf McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 351 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Going out of
your way to avoid acquiring unwelcome knowledge is a species of intent.").
111. See, e.g., United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 238 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding
that failure to act can establish liability); In re Nat'l Mortg. Equity Corp. Mortg. Pool
Certificates Sec. Litig., 636 F. Supp. 1138, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that active
concealment or suppression of facts by a nonfiduciary equates to a false representation,
rather than mere failure to disclose).
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Joint Employers and the ControlFactor

Within the joint employment relationship standard,l 12 the extent to
control the means and manner of the worker is considered the overriding
factor for finding joint employment status.' 13 Even though the joint
employer standard does not fully explain the rationale for holding nonemployers liable, it may provide a reason to examine more closely a
client's ability to prevent or remedy the discrimination in cases where
staffing companies discriminate."14 However, tests for joint employer
liability suggest that holding a party to the "knows-or-should-know"
standard requires employer status, which the ADA does not appear to
require."'5 Joint employer liability therefore does not fully explain what
duty, if any, a non-employer owes to applicants and workers.
c.

Tortious Interference

While the test for tortious interference establishes a duty not to interfere
with a party's employment contract for a third party regardless of
employment, this test can only justify holding a client company liable
where it intentionally interfered with the worker's and staffing firm's
agreement that no discrimination shall take place." 6 While intent,
knowledge of an existing relationship, and damages may be present where
a client company continues to provide business to a staffing firm it knows
to have discriminated against applicants, such a claim would likely fail on
account of the missing causal relationship between the client company's
conduct and the rejection of the applicant by the staffing firm." 7
112. See Shah v. Littlefuse, Inc., No. 12 CV 6845, 2013 WL 1828926, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 29, 2013) (providing that a joint employer would be required to take
appropriate action if it knows or should know that the staffing firm has discriminated
against the workers in its assignment).
113. See Greene & O'Brien, supra note 51, at 780 (stressing the importance of
control in finding joint employer status).
114. Cf EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 28-29 (indicating that
the right to control the worker creates joint liability, implying that client companies that
have the ultimate decision-making power over who is hired may satisfy the control
requirement with regard to hiring discrimination).
115. See Rubinstein, supra note 15, at 640 (explaining that "controlling employers"
under the Occupational Safety Health Act qualify as quasi-employers because they do
not directly employ the subcontractors, yet they are subject to regulation, which
emphasizes the importance of control and regulation in assessing employer or
employer-like status).
116. See Pirruccello, supra note 10, at 207 (noting that the interfering party must
actually possess intent and mere negligent interference is not enough).
117. See, e.g., Lyons v. Midwest Glazing, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1075 (N.D. Iowa
2003) (holding that, although the employer lost some business since the employee's
dismissal, the employer's claim of tortious interference failed on causation because it
was not unusual that some customers felt loyal to the employee rather than the
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Even though the common law tests point to certain duties for client
companies and staffing agencies, courts lack a uniform principle to apply
statutory anti-discrimination laws in a consistent way.
2.

NationalInconsistency in Addressing Unemployment

Discrimination

Quasi-discriminatory practices, such as unemployment discrimination,
further add to the problem of failing to consistently address employment
discrimination because no federal law directly prohibits the practice." 8
Nonetheless, due to recently enacted state legislation,"9 quasidiscriminatory practices could result in additional claims that raise
questions about client liability and might lead to even greater
* 120
inconsistencies.
In areas where state statutes do not prohibit quasi-discrimination or do
not provide private rights of action, persons affected may still be able to
bring action under a disparate impact claim.121 Testimony provided by the
National Women's Law Center and the Economic Policy Institute has
acknowledged that unemployment discrimination may have a serious
negative impact on women and people of color.' 2 2 In jurisdictions that
company that employed him). But cf Med. Indus. Inc. v. Maersk Med. Ltd., 230 F.
Supp. 2d 857, 871 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that a defendant interfered with the
plaintiffs prospective economic relationship with a generically-defined third party is
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss where plaintiffs alleged that it had a
reasonable expectation of entering into valid business relationships with thousands of
customers).
118. See Ballman, supra note 62 (listing several ways in which an employer can
legally discriminate against a worker).
119. See Birk, supra note 14 (illustrating that a number of states and municipalities
have passed legislation that makes it illegal to discriminate against applicants based on
their status as unemployed).
120. See Subadhra Sriram, Background Check Guidelines Make a Murky Situation
Murkier,
STAFFING
INDUSTRY
ANALYSTS
(Apr.
23,
2013),
http://www.staffingindustry.com/Research-Publications/Blogs/Subadhra-Sriram-sBlog/Background-Check-Guidelines-Make-a-Murky-Situation-Murkier (stating that the
lack of a federal anti-discrimination statute forbidding the practice could lead to stark
differences between unemployment discrimination cases litigated under differing state
statutes and under a disparate impact theory).
121. See Rutherglen, supra note 30, at 1297 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971)) (explaining that a plaintiff has a reduced burden of proof, whereas a
defendant has the burden of justifying employment practices with adverse impact).
122. See EEOC to Examine Treatment of Unemployed Job Seekers (2011) (written
testimony of Fatima Goss Graves, Vice President for Education and Employment,
National Women's Law Center) [hereinafter Graves Testimony], available at
http://wwwl.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-16-1l/graves.cfm (citing Current Employment
Statistics-CES
(National),
DEP'T
OF
LABOR
(Feb.
5,
2010),
http://bls.gov/ces/cesbtabs.htm); see also Bassett, supra note 29 (pointing out that the
use of code-words to mask a discriminatory request is common practice among staffing
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have declared the practice illegal, the number of discrimination claims
against staffing firms and their clients will likely increase.123
3.

Effects of "Quasi-Discrimination"on Protected Groups

A substantial number of articles shed light on the quasi-discriminatory
practices that staffing firms use to discriminate against protected groups.' 24
Particularly, the discrimination against individuals who are unemployed
has been a method openly used by staffing agencies.' 2 5
Several protected groups appear to be overrepresented in unemployment
figures.12 6 As the Economic Policy Institute's cited figures and common
sense indicate, because the "unemployed population is disproportionately
made up of people of color," policies and advertisements that actively
exclude unemployed applicants from the selection process will probably
have an adverse effect on people of color.12 7
Furthermore, a report by the National Women's Law Center, discussing
unemployment rates for women, contends that restricting applications from
unemployed job seekers likely has an impact on women in nontraditional
fields and within certain age groups where women experience higher
unemployment than men.128

agencies and their clients).
123. See Annie Karni, Lawsuits Feared From New Unemployment Law, CRAIN'S
N.Y. Bus. (Mar. 14, 2013, 3:52 PM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/
20130314/LABORUNIONS/130319919 (predicting that the new law banning
unemployment discrimination will result in fines and litigations that could ultimately
motivate prospective employers to take their business elsewhere).
124. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 29 (discussing unemployment discrimination);
J.T. O'Donnell, Help! I'm Too Beautiful to get Hired,CAREEREALISM
(Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.careerealism.com/help-too-beautiful-get-hired/ (explaining
that an employer may refuse to hire a woman based on her physical appearance, unless
that hiring procedure is likely to have an adverse effect on women).
125. See Bassett, supra note 29 (showing that ads requiring applicants to be
currently employed appear on job sites every day); see also Alice Gomstyn, Faking Job
References for a Price, ABC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/
fake-job-references-real-jobs/story?id=8401993 (featuring one company that has gone
so far as to create a business masking as an applicant's former employer in order to
help its clients secure the next paycheck).
126. See, e.g., Austin Testimony, supra note 33 (demonstrating that African
American and Hispanic applicants are 1.8 and 1.5 times more likely to be unemployed
than similarly situated white applicants).
127. See id.
128. See Graves Testimony, supra note 122 (declaring that, in 2007, women made
up only 2.2 percent of workers in positions like construction laborers, only 20.5 percent
of workers in protective service occupations and also that-among the unemployed
workers between the age of 45 and 54-women were unemployed over two months
longer than men).
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Because a finding of disparate impact does not require evidence of an
employer's discriminatory intent or motivation, protected groups may still
hold the employer liable under Title VII.12 9 If a staffing agency
discriminates against the unemployed and this identified practice has a
disparate impact on minority applicants, then unless the staffing firm could
demonstrate that employment was a necessary criterion for the position
sought, the complaining parties would be able to state a cause of action.' 30
This is important because disparate impact carves out a duty to refrain from
unintentional discrimination, alluding to a negligence-like standard of
liability under Title VII, which could help frame a proper duty for staffing
firms and client companies.
The recent reports describing an overrepresentation of certain protected
groups in unemployment figures encourage the EEOC to vigorously
enforce Title VII in cases where facially neutral practices adversely impact
protected groups.' 3 2 Therefore, even in jurisdictions where unemployment
discrimination remains legal, the increased coverage and examination by
the EEOC and several news sources will likely increase discrimination
claims by affected workers and applicants against staffing firms and
clients.13 3 This could lead client companies to become more concerned
about their liability for engaging staffing firms who use these methods.
C.

Client Companies Remain Uninformed About Their Liabilityfor
Discriminationby Staffing Firms

The inconsistencies and hazy standards that stretch from federal and
state statutes across the common law, which subsequently find a home in
the EEOC's administrative guidelines, serve as guide posts for companies
129. See Tobin M. Nelson, Note, Word-of-Mouth Recruiting: Why Small Businesses
Using This Efficient PracticeShould Survive DisparateImpact Challenges Under Title
VII, 68 U. PITT. L. REv. 449, 453 (2006) (explaining that disparate impact claims do not
require any evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent or motivation).
130. See id. (describing that a plaintiffs prima facie case of disparate impact shifts
the burden to the employer to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job-related
and consistent with business necessity).
131. See Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 24 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 132 (2012) (arguing that the disparate impact doctrine already
contains certain negligence-like themes).

132. See, e.g., Craig Johnson, EEOC Guidance Complicates Background Check
Process, STAFFING INDUSTRY ANALYSTS (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.staffingindustry
.com/Research-Publications/Publications/CWS-3.0/April-2013/April-I 0-2013/EEOCGuidance-Complicates-Background-Check-Process (reporting that Pepsi's criminal
background check policy disproportionately excluded black applicants from permanent
employment, according to the EEOC).
133. See Kami, supra note 123 (estimating that newly passed unemployment
legislation will give millions of rejected applicants "a potential new weapon to wield
against any company who chooses not to hire them").
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who seek to educate themselves and their staff on hiring policies.13 4 These
standards, however, are insufficient to provide client companies with the
necessary framework to assess what duties they owe to prospective
employees. 135
As a result, companies are left to speculate and provide settlements to
escape legal action without firm knowledge of their duties under the law.' 3 6
The EEOC statements, the courts' interpretations of the ADA and Title VII,
and the recent settlement agreement between BP and the EEOC carve out a
duty for companies that includes accountability for facilitating
discrimination through acts or omissions, regardless of their authority to
place or reject an applicant. 37 The statutory language does not, however,
clearly warrant the inference of a duty for non-employers. Client
companies can reasonably assume that their knowledge about receiving a
non-diverse applicant pool due to a staffing firm's discriminatory practice
may expose them to litigation if they maintain a contractual relationship
with the staffing firm.' 3 8 Nonetheless, the outcome of such litigation
remains hazy.13 9 In light of recent legislation banning unemployment
discrimination, clients will likely face the same issues of liability that arise
in traditional employment discrimination litigation when maintaining a

134. See, e.g., Ingersoll, supra note 26, (referencing the EEOC Guidelines and
providing updates on EEOC standards).
135. Cf Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers,
Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1357, 1360-62 (2009) (pointing out that a large and unanimous body of case law
and administrative guidance holds employers liable for third-party harassment, and that
Title VII is capable of covering such cases, despite the common belief that an
employer's duty to cover an employee's limitations-regardless of the origin of
discrimination-is instead covered by the ADA).
136. See Jennifer Cerven, Employers Should Use Care to Avoid Discrimination
When
Using Temporary Staffing Agencies, LEXOLOGY
(Jul. 8, 2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-c4f8975b-lel 3-4933-9eda4cl26b0623b8 (advising that an employer may be held liable if the actions of a
temporary staffing agency resulted in discrimination against an applicant).
137. See id. (discussing a settlement following allegations by a female applicant
that the defendant's temporary staffing firm discriminated against an applicant).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (2012) (allowing for liability in cases where
employers participate in contractual relationships or arrangements that have the effect
of discriminating against a disabled worker). But see id. (implying that a client
company qualifies as an employer if it uses a temporary staffing agency to select
applicants, even though it has not yet seemed to exercise control or supervisory
authority over the applicant).
139. Cf O'Gorman,supra note 2, at 441-42 (indicating that it remains unclear what
legal standards provide the basis for the EEOC's position on related issues of liability
for staffing firms and clients).
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relationship with employment agencies that refuse to hire or consider
unemployed applicants.14 0
1.

Risk ofIncreasedDiscriminationLitigation Amplifies the Need
for Clarificationand Consistency

While it may seem unlikely - without any prior indication by a client that a staffing agency would preemptively discriminate against the workers
it sends to the client company, sources have indicated that staffing firms are
generally well aware of the preferences that its clients have when hiring
new workers.141 It is therefore reasonable to assume that staffing firms
carry such notions with them, even where no specific discriminatory
request has been made.14 2 Additionally, the use of code words and other
illusive ways a client may convey a certain preference can result in a claim
against the staffing firm while the client escapes liability. 43 Thus, the
current body of law fails to provide consistent remedies for common forms
of employment discrimination.
2.

Lack of Uniformity and Awareness Leads to Speculation and
Preemptive Payouts

Client companies are ultimately left to speculate as to their
responsibilities in cases where staffing firms discriminate due to the
uncertainty about governing legal standards.1 44 As the BP settlement
demonstrates, client companies agree to settle in response to discrimination
allegations against their contractors with the EEOC, even if it was the
staffing agency that made discriminatory hiring decisions.14 5
The
settlement agreement between the EEOC and BP included a provision that
140. See Karni, supra note 123 (emphasizing that unemployment legislation serves
as a potential new weapon for millions of applicants against companies who chose not
to hire them).
141. See Bassett, supra note 29 (reporting that an anonymous recruiter knows that
when a company says "we want somebody with small hands" for an administrative
position, it means they want an attractive woman).
142. See, e.g., EEOC v. Olsten Staffing Servs. Corp., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031
(W.D. Wis. 2009) (illustrating how a specialist at a staffing agency can pre-select in a
discriminatory way based on her own assumptions about the client's preference).
143. See Nelson, supra note 129, at 452 (explaining how mouth recruitment in
effect enlists existing employees to help screen new applicants conscientiously, which
could lead to the inference that the screener would be the one to the discriminatory act,
rather than the employer).
144. See generally Baker & Daniels, When is an Employee not an Employee?, 8.1
IND. EMP. L. LETTER 3 (1998) (applying a confused theory of liability, referring on one
hand to an employer who may be powerless to stop the discrimination, but nonetheless
sharing in control); see also Sriram, supra note 120 (indicating that client companies
are unsure but are encouraged to err on the side of caution).
145. Mendez, supra note 13.
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BP would provide traming to its administrators who plan to hire
contractors.14 6 This supports an inference that the EEOC holds BP
responsible for inadequate training of its administrators, allowing for the
discriminatory practices by its contractors to continue.1 47 It is unclear what
the required training for BP administrators will be, and whether it will
include taking reasonable steps to uncover discriminatory hiring practices
and taking appropriate action.
It is clear, however, that companies, when entering into agreements in an
effort to avoid litigation and bad publicity, may rely heavily on the EEOC's
interpretations of liability that lack firm support in the law.14 8 As a result,
in this case, the EEOC may have seized an opportunity to declare an
assumed liability on part of BP, even though BP merely sought to avoid
further bad publicity following the oil spill, and it is not clear that the
matter would have survived in court.149 This suggests that the EEOC may
in practice enforce a legal standard for client companies based primarily on
the client's good faith effort to avoid litigation, rather than on legal
principles and duties embedded in the statute.
III. CLIENT LIABILITY SHOULD BE UNIFORMLY ADDRESSED IN CASES OF
INDEPENDENT DISCRIMINATION BY STAFFING FIRMS

In light of the economic downturn, workers and the unemployed have
become increasingly aware of discriminatory hiring practices, leading to a
rise in claims against former or prospective employers.150 Furthermore,

146. See EEOC & BP Press Release, supra note 42.
147. See id. (reporting that the settlement agreement included contractual
safeguards requiring contractors to abide by EEO laws and to offer training to BP
administrators who engage contractors).
148. See Taylor Selcke, Pepsi to pay $3.1 million in MN discrimination case, THE
11,
2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/news
Bus. JOURNALS (Jan.
/2012/01/11/pepsi-settles-mn-discrimination-case.html?page=alI (entering into one of
the largest settlement agreements in Minneapolis after allegations of improper use of
background checks during hiring, even though courts have not yet ruled favorably for
the EEOC on the matter).
149. See generally Mendez, supra note 13 (reporting that resolving the matter
outside of the court system reflects the EEOC's view that contractors are required to
comply with federal employment laws, that the employer is responsible for EEO
compliance by the staffing agency, and that an organization cannot claim unawareness
about a staffing agency's violation of these laws as a defense).
150. Cf Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., Fulbright& Jaworski2010 Litigation Trends
Survey: Companies Expect More Litigation, Regulation; Continue Emphasis on
Managing Legal Cost In Struggling Economy, Bus. WIRE (Oct. 10, 2010, 9:00 AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20101013005343/en/Fulbright-Jaworski2010-Litigation-Trends-Survey-Companies (predicting that, as a result of a lagging
economy, corporate counsel expected legal disputes to increase, indicating that
economic hardship could at least in part fuel litigation).
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client companies in jurisdictions that have adopted anti-unemployment
discrimination legislation will likely encounter similar claims by
unemployed applicants who experienced discrimination by a staffing
agency, similar to claims brought under the ADA or Title VIL'
Meanwhile, these client companies will likely continue to settle claims to
avoid costly and lengthy litigation for conventional discrimination by
contractors or agencies without knowing how far their liability actually
extends.152
If the ADA statute implies a pre-existing duty for non-employers to
refrain from participating in relationships with employment agencies that
have the effect of subjecting individuals to all types of discrimination, other
anti-discrinination statutes should reflect this. More specifically, if the
duty does not just apply to disability discrimination, such a duty should
also be incorporated into Title VII, rather than leaving employers to fill in
the gaps based on statements issued by the EEOC and other antidiscrimination statutes.15 3 If duties were incorporated into the statute,
employers would be clear on potential sources of liability and courts would
be more consistent in applying the statute to employment discrimination
cases.
Furthermore, to ensure greater consistency, statutory amendments should
clarify the duties and principles for client companies who use staffing
firms, rather than addressing the issues through the common law and
EEOC interpretations.1 54 The common law has filled in the gaps in the
wake
of increasingly complex issues of employer-employee
relationships.' 5 5 However, the case-by-case treatment has resulted in some
confusion about the duties assigned to staffing firms and clients regarding
both current and prospective employees.' 5 6 This confusion arises because
courts differ in providing justifications for assigning employer liability.

151. Cf Karni, supra note 123 (expecting the legislation banning unemployment
discrimination to be a new source of litigation).
152. See FED. R. Civ. P. 68 advisory committee's note (encouraging settlements and
avoidance of protracted litigation); Bree Bemwanger, How Settlement is Hurting Us
All, LIFE OF THE LAW (Sept. 21, 2013), http://www.lifeofthelaw.org/how-settlementculture-is-hurting-us-all/ (discussing a recent case in which the National Football
League sought to avoid potentially embarrassing litigation by reaching a tentative
settlement in response to concussion-related allegations from former players and
issuing a carefully-worded press release).
153. See Bernwanger, supra note 152 (arguing that even the most fairly bargained
settlements come at the expense of failing to set legal precedent).
154. Cf DAU-SCHMIDT, COVINGTON & FINKIN, supra note 75, at 45, 50 (providing
the possibility of a statutorily-focused analysis by the legislature); Rubinstein, supra
note 15, at 606.
155. See Pirruccello,supra note 10, at 222-23; Rubinstein, supra note 15, at 653.
156. Cf Zatz, supra note 135 (making the argument that addressing employer
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In addition to the unconsolidated areas of employment discrimination
concerning staffing agencies, quasi-discriminatory practices that result in
disparate impact for minority applicants, such as unemployment
discrimination, are receiving increasing attention.15 7 Experts recommend
that the EEOC provide guidance on unemployment discrimination, which
provides additional urgency to consolidate principles of employer liability
because such new guidance will likely increase litigation against staffing
firms who tend to use these methods.'5 8
The prospect of increased litigation coupled with the current lack of
clarity in the law about client company liability calls for statutory
clarification. If Congress includes a provision which specifies the principle
or legal theory that supports one clear standard of liability, this would
likely result in more consistency in the courts.159 Furthermore, companies
can incorporate these principles into their employment manuals and
newsletters, and combat discrimination through preventative measures
rather than in the courts or settlement agreements. 160
A clear principle justifying the issues of non-employer liability has
become particularly important because employment relationships have
become increasingly complex.' 6 ' In the wake of a dramatic change in the
workforce,162 it is particularly important for businesses that use staffing

responsibility apart from a causal analysis using two different theories can establish
employer responsibility, but merely does so in different ways).
157. See Press Release, Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Out of Work? Out of
Luck (Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter EEOC Press Release], available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-29-12.cfm (reporting on the EEOC's
investigation of the impact of unemployment discrimination on protected groups).
158. Cf Hans A. von Spakousky, The Dangerous Impact of Barring Criminal
Background Checks: Congress Needs to Overrule the EEOC's New Employment
"Guidelines", THE
HERITAGE
FOUNDATION
1-2
(May
31,
2012),
http://thfmedia.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/1m8 I.pdf (comparing the EEOC issued
Guidance to the decision of an Indiana court that pointed to a duty for landowners to
protect their business invitees from foreseeable criminal attacks, resulting in a huge
increase in lawsuits filed under the theory of negligent hiring).
159. Cf Rogers, supra note 78, at 49 (arguing that a duty-based regime would lead
more companies to invest in monitoring and deterrence efforts).
160. See id. at 39 (mentioning that scholars have therefore often endorsed dutybased regimes allowing mitigation of damages for good-faith preventative measures);
see, e.g., Cerven, supra note 136 (illustrating that the company preferred a settlement
over continuing to litigate a gender discrimination case that arose from the actions
taken by the company's temporary staffing agency).
161. Cf Your Legal Obligation to Temporary Agency Workers, supra note I
(emphasizing that clients must know of their obligations when utilizing staffing
agencies).
162. See Rogers, supra note 78, at 17 (stating that even leading global firms are
now subcontracting and outsourcing extensively, handling only essential functions inhouse, and have cut back on long-term employment relationships).
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firms to hire workers that know of the obligations and risks that arise from
this relationship.163 However, articulating these risks only by providing
possible scenarios fails to define the purpose of assigning such liability.1 64
If client liability for staffing firm discrimination, as provided by the ADA,
rests on a duty for businesses that know or should know of a staffing firm's
discrimination to prevent discrimination that arises from a contractual
relationship with such a firm, Congress should affirm that this duty
applies. 6 1
Such a duty would definitively open up a liability to which the EEOC
has thus far only alluded: a liability for non-employers who facilitate or fail
to prevent discrimination when engaging staffing firms to hire their
workers. 166 Articulating the broader principles for finding liability in
unconventional employer-employee relationships will ensure more
consistency in judicial interpretations, cause less confusion among
employers who utilize staffing firms, and encourage preventative measures
throughout the hiring process in place of costly litigation.
CONCLUSION
Because the principles underlying EEOC Guidelines, ADA duties, and
common law interpretations are not firmly rooted in Title VII's plain
meaning, companies are uncertain as to how far their liability extends in
cases involving discrimination against protected groups and groups that are
protected by state laws. To adapt the statute to the modem workforce and
to ensure greater consistency and transparency of the legal standards
governing litigation in this area, Congress should amend Title VII and
address the duties staffing companies and their clients have to employees
and non-employees.

163.

See Baker & Daniels, supra note 144 (warning that many clients of staffing

firms make expensive mistakes by remaining uninformed about EEO obligations).
164. Cf O'Gorman, supra note 2, at 437 (eluding to a duty-based approach by
describing co-worker harassment liability, and illustrating that prompt remedial action
can deter future wrongdoing by sending the message that the employer does not
tolerate harassment, and that this can be considered a limitation on liability that
promotes the statutes' purposes).
165. Cf id. (arguing that it is problematic that the EEOC does not disclose the basis
for its conclusion).
166. Cf Rubinstein, supra note 15, at 657-58 (concluding that third-party liability
has articulated an employer-like duty on those who assume an important responsibility
that effects the terms and conditions of workers).

